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  Executive summary 
The European Union faces the twin crises of Covid-19 and climate change. Confronting both 
crises leads to an unprecedented demand on public resources which in turn leads to the 
question of how to raise the required funds a) without jeopardising a weak economy recovering 
from the pandemic and b) without undermining broad political support for climate action.  
 
This policy study investigates the potential of a European net wealth tax to raise substantial 
revenues while supporting the economy and the consensus on climate action. To achieve this, 
household survey data from the European Central Bank (covering 22 EU countries) are 
analysed. To address the problem of under-reporting of wealth at the top of the distribution in 
survey data, a Pareto distribution is fitted to the right tail of the data and used to create an 
amended data set which also represents these missing rich, whose wealth goes unreported.     
 
The Pareto-amended data show that household wealth is highly concentrated among the 
wealthiest households: the richest 1% hold 32% of total net wealth in the EU22 while the 
poorest half of all households only hold about 4.5% of total net wealth.2 These data are then 
used to estimate revenues for four different tax models. The results show that annual revenues 
between €192 billion (1.6% of GDP) and €1,281 billion (10.8% of GDP) across the EU22 are 
possible. Non-progressive (flat tax) designs yield revenues at the low end of this range 
while strongly progressive designs are responsible for the high revenue estimates at 
the upper end of this range. Conversely, the models’ ability to actively reduce the current 
concentration of wealth in Europe varies with the degree of progressivity of the tax design. In 
sum, a net wealth tax exhibits high revenue potential, which is a direct result of the 
observed high levels of inequality and is far larger than that for other proposals 
currently being discussed at the European level. 
 
A combination of clever design choices, more resources and better infrastructure for 
the EU’s tax authorities would make a European net wealth tax feasible. With respect to 
the tax design, high exemption thresholds between €1 million and €2 million, paired with 
progressive tax rates and a broad tax base, imply that only the richest 1% to 3% of all 
households are taxed and thus the problem of illiquid tax subjects is avoided, while keeping 
the revenue potential high. Boosting tax authorities’ resources to enforce the tax and to build 
appropriate infrastructure, such as real estate valuation databases and company registers, 
will ensure high levels of compliance and enforcement. Best practice examples such as 
Switzerland (valuation) and Norway (third party reporting) exist and can be used as a point of 
reference for successful implementation. To strengthen compliance an implementation at the 
European level is desirable.  
 
The results of this policy study show that overall, a European net wealth tax has the 
potential to make a substantial contribution to the EU’s efforts to organise a decisive 
response to the twin crises of Covid-19 and climate change. A net wealth tax is not only 
attractive because its revenue potential ranks amongst the highest of the potential 
alternatives that are currently being discussed at the European level, but also because 
of its ability to reduce historically high levels of wealth inequality in Europe.   
 
2 A full tabulation of the wealth distribution in the EU22 can be found in the Appendix. For individual 
country tables consult the Online Appendix. 
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The European Union faces the twin crises of climate change and potentially the deepest 
recession in a century due to Covid-19. Tackling them both will require an unprecedented 
mobilisation of (public) resources. The challenge of climate change alone is likely to require 
additional investment of €850 billion or about 6% of GDP per year in the EU27 (Wildauer et al 
2020). The Covid recession will require further resources due to the expected contraction of 
the EU economy by 8% in 2020, twice as deep as in the 2009 recession. Raising substantial 
tax revenues within this context without jeopardising the economic recovery and without 
introducing strongly regressive taxes, which hit low-income households hardest, poses a 
significant challenge. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
has repeatedly called for its member countries to use property taxes to raise revenues without 
hampering fragile economies after the 2009 financial crisis (Rawdanowicz et al 2013, OECD 
2020). In addition, several economists have called for increased wealth taxation to raise public 
revenues and to reduce and correct market inequalities (Piketty 2014, Landais et al 2020, 
Saez and Zucman 2019, Advani et al 2020). When it comes to the issue of raising revenues 
to fight climate change, Chancel and Piketty (2015) argue for strongly progressive income 
taxes, since globally the richest 10% of the population are responsible for 45% of all carbon 
emissions. In addition, direct carbon taxation is strongly regressive and risks undermining the 
political will to act, as demonstrated by the Gilets jaunes movement in France, which erupted 
initially in response to increased fuel taxation. 
 
These considerations point towards wealth taxation as a tool to generate urgently needed 
public revenues to fight climate change in a just way, while endangering neither the economic 
recovery nor social and political stability. A key obstacle in the public debate on the issue is 
the lack of data and empirical evidence with respect to the distribution of wealth among private 
households. This makes it difficult to estimate the revenue potential of net wealth tax 
proposals, which would be key for an informed debate on the matter.  
 
This policy study makes use of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) efforts to improve the 
available information on the balance sheet positions of private households by means of the 
Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS). This survey provides vital input for the 
associated policy-debate as it allows us to estimate the revenue potential of four different net 
wealth tax proposals based on 22 EU countries (referred to as EU22).3 In contrast to existing 
 
3 Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Germany, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
Spain. 
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studies and estimates (such as Landais et al 2020) our analysis is based on much more recent 
and detailed data, covering 22 European countries.   
 
Our findings can be summarised as follows: first, the revenue potential of a European net 
wealth tax is substantial and lies between 1.6% and 3.0% of GDP annually when considering 
moderate proposals for wealth taxation and taking into account some degree of tax evasion. 
A highly progressive tax model would have a revenue potential of up 10.8% of GDP (in the 
first year). Second, how much revenue is raised depends crucially on the design features of 
the tax. We find that setting high exemption thresholds, which would significantly simplify the 
administration by sparing cash-poor but asset-rich households, does not inhibit the revenue 
potential if paired with a progressive tax structure. Even moderately progressive tax designs 
have the potential to generate revenues of up to 3% of GDP annually, while leaving 99% of all 
households exempt. 
 
The remaining policy study is structured as follows: in section 2 we briefly review some of the 
recent proposals for increasing fiscal revenues at the European level. In addition, we will 
summarise Europe’s experience with net wealth taxes. Both discussions will serve as a 
reference point for our own wealth tax revenue estimates. Section 3 discusses some of the 
difficulties involved in accurately measuring the distribution of wealth among households and 
presents the strategy we apply to tackle these data challenges. We then present a breakdown 
of the wealth distribution across the EU22. Section 4 presents the different tax models and the 
corresponding revenue estimates, section 5 discusses key implementation issues, and section 
6 concludes. 
2. Raising revenues for a green recovery 
Against the backdrop of the climate crisis, the Covid-19 pandemic has spurned a debate on 
the funding of society for the duration of the pandemic and the funding of a European green 
transition. This section provides an overview of current debates on how additional resources 
could be mobilised. Special attention is devoted to proposals which are particularly suitable 
for being implemented at the European level. In the second part of this section, we summarise 
past experiences with net wealth taxes in Europe. Overall, this section will serve as the point 
of reference when discussing our results. 
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2.1. An overview of current debates  
As part of the Circular Economy Action Plan, which is one of the main blocks of the European 
Green Deal, member states’ contributions to the European budget will be linked to the 
production of unrecycled, single-use plastic waste (EUCO 2020). This new funding 
arrangement came into effect in January 2021 and introduces incentives for member states to 
reduce the use of single-use plastics. The proposed Single-Use Plastics Directive (EC 2018a) 
sets out a concrete action plan on how to reduce plastic waste across the European Union. 
Importantly, however as it was presented, member states have significant leeway over which 
measures to rely on to meet these goals. This means that without newly introduced plastic 
taxes by individual member states, no additional fiscal resources are raised via these 
channels.   
 
The European Commission is also looking into reforming the European Energy Directive (EC 
2019). Currently the taxation of energy is not consistently linked to negative production 
externalities such as greenhouse gas emissions or nuclear waste. It would be desirable to set 
minimum tax rates across the EU and link these to the specific negative externalities of each 
energy carrier. In addition, ending direct and indirect (eg, preferential tax treatment) subsidies 
for fossil fuels could free up to €55 billion per year across the EU for alternative uses, according 
to a study funded by the European Commission (Trinomics 2018). Ending fossil fuel subsidies 
would include ending the exemption of aviation and maritime fuels from taxation. 
 
Eliminating fossil fuel subsidies is closely tied to the reform of the Emissions Trading System 
(ETS) and the introduction of a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). The latter 
scheme would tax carbon-intensive imports, which is often regarded as a prerequisite for 
extending the ETS’s coverage to include energy intensive sectors that are faced with 
competition from abroad, addressing so-called ‘carbon leakage’. The European Council 
agreed at its meeting in July 2020 that the Commission should work on a proposal for a CBAM 
and a corresponding reform of the ETS with the aim of incorporating the aviation and maritime 
sector into the ETS. The European Commission estimates that a reformed ETS could raise 
additional revenues of between €3 billion and €10 billion a year across Europe (EC 2020). 
Krenek et al (2018) estimate the revenue potential of a CBAM to be between €27 billion and 
€84 billion a year.  
 
It is important to note, however, that all revenue sources are expected to decline over time 
with the successful implementation of low carbon technologies or a reduction in the use of 
plastics. 
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Since the 2008-09 financial crisis, the European Commission has been considering a 
Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) which is yet to be agreed upon between the member states. 
Several countries have successfully raised large revenues from an FTT in the recent past, 
including Switzerland with revenues of about 0.5% of GDP and the United Kingdom with 
revenues of about 0.2% of GDP, as well as Taiwan with 0.8% of GDP (Matheson 2011). 
Recent estimates of the revenue potential from a financial transaction tax in the EU are 
consistent with this international experience and vary from 0.3% of GDP to 1.4% of GDP 
(Pekanov and Schratzenstaller 2019; European Commission 2013; Schulmeister 2011). The 
revenue potential depends on several factors including the tax rates and the tax base (the 
taxable transactions and instruments, residency and issuance rules), the size of the financial 
sector, and the nature of exemptions. Member states have failed to reach an agreement on 
the FTT and currently the proposal languishes at the bottom of a legislative agenda where its 
progress is periodically reviewed.4 
 
In 2016 the European Commission proposed a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB) across the EU.5 During the first phase, member states would adopt a common 
(harmonised) set of rules for determining a company’s taxable profits. The second phase 
would effectively see to the abolition of transfer pricing in favour of ‘formulary apportionment’, 
which means that profits of multinational companies are allocated to the different countries in 
which the company operates by a formula based on total territorial sales, capital stock and 
workers employed. Based on the data of Tørsløv et al (2020) €47 billion in corporate income 
tax was lost in 2017 across the 16 countries within the European Union for which data are 
available, and which are classified by the authors as non-tax havens.6 This amounts to 0.4% 
of GDP for this group of countries. Going beyond the problem of corporate tax avoidance 
would involve tackling the substantial gap between statutory corporate income tax rates and 
effective tax rates in the European Union. For example, while Germany has a statutory 
corporate income tax rate of 30%, its effective tax rate is below 14%. Closing the gap between 
the statutory and effective tax rate across these 16 EU countries would yield an additional 
€136 billion in revenues (1.3% of GDP). Reversing the secular trend of cuts to the corporate 
income tax rate (Marques 2021) and applying a common corporate income tax rate of 35% 
across these countries would increase corporate income tax revenues by €403 billion (3.8% 
of GDP).  
 
4 Council of the European Union (2019) Outcome of the Council meeting: Economic and Financial 
Affairs, 3699th Council meeting, 10336/19, 14 June 2019. 
5 COM(2016) 685 final. 
6 This includes Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. 
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In general, the debate on the reform of the EU’s own resources resurfaced during the 
European Council negotiations on the recovery plan and the EU budget for the 2021-2027 
period. The council agreement includes an outline of EU-wide taxes that may complement the 
existing own resources and boost the recovery. The European Commission roadmap also 
introduces consultations for a digital levy, that is meant to ensure a fairer contribution from 
multinationals operating in the digital sphere. Concrete policy options are yet to be presented, 
but such an initiative has to be compatible with the international agreement at the G20 level 
on the reform of global corporate taxation, which remains a priority.   
2.2. Europe’s experience with net wealth taxes 
The taxation of wealth can be traced back to classical antiquity and it was in widespread use 
throughout Europe during the 19th and 20th centuries (Lehner 2000). However periodic net 
wealth taxes have been falling out of favour since the 1990s7 with the result that at the time of 
writing only three countries in Europe still have some form of periodic net wealth taxation: 
Norway, Switzerland and Spain (OECD 2018).8 Table 1 summarises the historic and current 
experience of periodic net wealth taxes in Europe. The picture which emerges is that revenues 
in most cases were modest at around 0.2% of GDP with two notable exceptions: Switzerland 
(0.93% of GDP) and Norway (0.47% of GDP) which are two of the three countries that are still 
levying a periodic net wealth tax.  
 
Two broad patterns emerge from Table 1 and the analysis of the European experiences on 
wealth taxation:  
1) Historically there is much variation in the exemption thresholds of different countries. 
With a few exceptions most countries opted for relatively low thresholds and a variety 
of exemptions – with the consequence that a relatively large share of the population 
was subjected to a complicated wealth tax. Most countries granted various exemptions 
on diverse classes of assets: pension assets, primary residences, agricultural assets, 
business assets, ‘difficult-to-value’ assets, and assets of national cultural value (see 
OECD 2018). Saez and Zucman (2019) argue that the combination of low thresholds 
and numerous exemptions eroded the tax base while simultaneously opening many 
legal avenues to the extremely wealthy for avoiding the tax. This led to declining 
political support and eventual termination of net wealth taxation in most countries.  
 
7 A similar process can be observed in the case of inheritance taxation, where the decline started in 
the 1970s. 
8 Note that the Netherlands incorporated its wealth tax as a component of personal income tax in 
2001, and that it is calculated as a presumptive return on assets. 
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2) Most countries opted for a single tax rate usually around or below 1%, while only a few 
countries implemented progressive schemes with more than two tax bands. 
(Re)Introducing net wealth taxation in Europe should thus follow the principle of relying on 
relatively high thresholds (aimed at the top 1% of the population) without any additional 
exemptions. This approach would ensure that numerous and complicated exemptions do not 
provide loopholes for the very wealthy, while solving administrative problems such as liquidity 
concerns (Saez and Zucman 2019). 
 
Table 1: Net wealth taxation in Europe  
Average tax 
revenues share 








Austria 0.17% 1970-1993 1994 17,230 1% 
Denmark 0.21% 1966-1996 1997   
Finland 0.09% 1970-2005 2006 303,132 0.8% 
France 0.22% 2008-2017 2018 823,836 0.5% to 1.5% 
Germany 0.14% 1970-1996 1997 83,192 1% 
Iceland 0.23% 1970-1997 2006 518,048 1.5% 
Netherlands 0.21% 1969-2000 2001 123,245 0.7% 
Norway 0.47% 1989-2018 active 150,000 0.85% 
Spain 0.18% 1999-2018 active 167,129 0.2% to 2.5% 
Sweden 0.20% 1965-2006 2007 191,245 1.5% 
Switzerland 0.93% 1998-2017 active 79,548 0.53% to 0.73% 
Source: The threshold and tax rates for Switzerland apply to the Canton of Bern due to the approximately 20,000 
administrative districts having their own wealth taxes. The threshold applies across the Canton (12% of the 
national population) and the tax rates are the aggregated marginal effective net wealth tax rates across the 
Canton for the average and upper taxpayer. Sources: NO and ES: Ernst & Young (2019); CH: Brülhart et al 
(2016); France: Institut des Politiques Publiques (2020); NL: Lehner (2000); rest: OECD (2018). 
 
3. Measuring household wealth in Europe 
Providing a definition of household wealth is a necessary starting point for any discussion on 
the distribution of wealth. This policy study focuses on net wealth – we are looking at the value 
of all assets minus outstanding liabilities. For the sake of readability, we use wealth and net 
wealth as synonyms and explicitly use the term gross wealth when referring to the value of 
assets before subtracting liabilities. Furthermore, the revenue estimations presented in the 
next section are based on household data and thus assume that the tax subjects are 
households. We will come back to these definitions when introducing the tax simulations. 
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3.1. Data sources and measurement challenges 
Obtaining a detailed picture of the distribution of wealth in Europe is difficult due to the limited 
availability of data. In general, three types of data are used. The first is tax data, ideally directly 
obtained from net wealth taxes. However, since Spain is the only EU country as of 2020 which 
still has a wealth tax, this option is not viable for providing insights into the distribution of wealth 
in Europe. Alternatively, tax data on capital incomes can be used to deduce the value of the 
underlying asset from which the taxed income stream derived. While this approach is widely 
used (Garbinti et al 2020), it can only provide an adequate picture of the distribution of wealth 
if there are few exemptions of capital income taxation, and at the same time if high net worth 
individuals do not hide or shield their capital income from taxation. In general, assets which 
do not generate income flows, which are subject to taxation, cannot be assessed with this 
method. Alternatively, estate tax data are used in the literature (Atkinson 2018, Alvaredo et al 
2018). 
 
The second source of data is so-called rich lists put together by journalists. The best-known 
example of such a rich list is the Forbes World’s Billionaires List. Similar, more specialised 
lists exist for several European countries. While such lists can provide valuable information on 
the wealthiest individuals and families in a country, it is clear that they represent only rough 
estimates based on the stock market valuation of holdings in listed companies and on the 
research carried out by the providers of the various rich lists. The detailed methods applied in 
this context are often undisclosed and can vary substantially across different providers and 
countries. These observations imply that relying solely on such lists at best provides a picture 
of the wealth distribution limited to the very rich, and potentially suffers from measurement 
error and cross-country inconsistencies.  
 
The third data source is household surveys, usually conducted by central banks. The Survey 
of Consumer Finances (SCF) in America is a longstanding example of high-quality household 
surveys on households’ balance sheets. The ECB’s Household Finance and Consumption 
Survey (HFCS) is a recent attempt to bring existing surveys such as those of the Italian and 
French central banks into a unified framework, and to collect data in countries which did not 
have such surveys before. Survey data come with the major advantage of providing a rich set 
of additional information about the household. A serious drawback is the potential that the 
resulting picture of the distribution of household wealth is seriously distorted if more affluent 
households do not participate, as is generally the case and has been documented in the past 
(Kennickell & McManus 1993, Kennickell 2017a, Kennickell 2017b, Vermeulen 2016, 
Schröder et al 2020). This problem is known as differential non-response bias. Some central 
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banks (like the US Fed) and some countries in the HFCS (most importantly France and Spain) 
address the problem of lower participation among affluent households by deliberately including 
a disproportionately large number of affluent households in the gross sample. The result is 
that the net sample will include a sizeable number of households from the tail of the distribution 
even if the overall rejection rate among the wealthy is high. This technique is called 
oversampling and crucially requires information on household wealth before the data collection 
starts. Traditionally, tax information is required in order to implement oversampling.9 To some 
extent, a high-quality oversampling approach combines the advantages of exploiting tax-data 
(data source 1) and implementing a survey methodology (data source 3). 
3.2. The approach of this policy study 
This study uses data from the ECB’s Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) 
and thus relies on household survey data. This means any wealth tax revenues based on this 
data source will be severely underestimated if the problem of differential non-response among 
rich households is not addressed. The HFCS differs from its US counterpart (Survey of 
Consumer Finances) in that each European country which participates in the HFCS carries 
out the data collection itself. The ECB provides a standardised framework determining what 
type of data are collected, as well as the broad methodological approach (ECB 2017). 
Crucially, however, there is no unified approach to tackling differential non-response across 
participating countries. This means the extent to which individual country data capture the tail 
of the distribution varies considerably. This can be seen when comparing the mean of the 
richest 5 observations across the 22 countries which participated in the third wave of the 
HFCS. For France, which implements stringent oversampling based on tax data, the mean of 
the richest 5 observations is €189 million. For the Netherlands the corresponding value is €8 
million and for Germany it is €31 million. In order to deal with the apparent under-
representation of affluent households in many countries, this policy study follows the approach 
of Eckerstorfer et al (2016) and Vermeulen (2018) in order to address the under-representation 
of high-net-worth households in the HFCS. 
 
This means that we first add observations from journalists' rich lists to the survey data and 
then fit a type I Pareto distribution to the tail of the data where the length of the Pareto tail is 
determined by an algorithm that searches for the best fit. After the Pareto tail is estimated, it 
is used to extrapolate those parts of the distribution which are missing in the raw survey data. 
 
9 Other forms of oversampling exist and rely on information such as excessive electricity consumption 
(Cyprus in the HFCS) or ownership of listed companies (German Socio-economic Panel). 
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This extrapolated tail is combined with the lower body of the survey data to construct an 
amended data set, which is used to estimate the wealth tax models discussed below.  
 
While rich list observations are not available for all countries in our sample,10 we aimed at a 
consistent approach for correcting for the under-representation of wealthy households in the 
top 1% of the distribution. In order to achieve this, we estimated a simple linear regression of 
the proportional increase of total net wealth held by the richest 1% of households before and 
after the Pareto model was fitted to the data (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) on the effective 
oversampling rate of the top 1% (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇1) and the overall response rate (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) based on the 
results of the 10 countries for which rich list data were available. We then corrected the wealth 
holdings of the households comprising the top 1% in the remaining countries, conditional on 
their effective oversampling and response rates. A cruder approach could have been to correct 
the top wealth brackets of those countries for which no rich lists are available simply based on 
the average correction of the 10 countries for which rich lists were available. However, 
conditioning on the effective oversampling and general response rate allowed us to take into 
account differences in survey quality across countries. 
3.3. The Pareto distribution 
Before we present the results of amending the HFCS survey data with a Pareto tail, this section 
briefly highlights the unique features of the Pareto distribution and why it is particularly useful 
to model the distribution of household wealth. The most important characteristic of the type I 
Pareto distribution is that it exhibits an extremely heavy tail. With distributions which do not 
exhibit a heavy tail, observations far from the mean (for example billionaires in the case of 
household wealth) are so unlikely that in any practical application the result would be that they 
are excluded from the model. From the fact that extreme wealth in the form of multi-millionaires 
and billionaires exists, however, it is clear that such distributions cannot be used to model 
household wealth. With a heavy-tailed distribution like the Pareto distribution, extreme 
observations such as billionaires are a central part of the model. In fact, Vilfredo Pareto, the 
economist after whom the distribution is named, used it to study the distribution of income and 
wealth in Italy. The occurrence of extreme values is not unique to economics or the distribution 
of income and wealth. Pareto tails occur in many applications inside and outside economics, 
such as studying the distribution of city sizes, the distribution of earthquake intensities, rainfall 
and wave intensity (see Gabaix 2009 for a survey). The uniting theme across these 
applications is that a Pareto distribution is used to model phenomena where a few 
 
10 We have rich list observations for Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain. 
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observations (ie, a few members of the population) are completely different from the bulk of 
the observations. 
 
Using Pareto distributions to model the distribution of wealth can be justified both by the fact 
that extreme outliers (ie, billionaires) do occur, and also on theoretical grounds. More than 60 
years ago Wold and Whittle (1957) showed that if wealth can be passed on to heirs, a Pareto 
distribution will occur independent of the starting distribution. The smaller the average number 
of heirs, the more unequal the distribution becomes. More recent so-called ‘exchange trading 
models’ focus on the interaction of the model’s agents, who are characterised by different 
saving propensities (Aydiner et al 2018, Chatterjee and Chakrabarti 2007, Bouchaud and 
Mezard 2000). Das and Yarlagadda (2005) for example show that different interaction forms 
lead to a Pareto distribution of wealth. Crucially, only those models which exhibit a theoretical 
mechanism that yields a Pareto distribution can reproduce the observed degree of inequality 
in the data. Saving rates increasing in wealth are among the most important of these 
mechanisms (Benhabib and Bisin 2018, p. 1284). Altogether, there is a sound basis for the 
decision to model the tail of the wealth distribution as Pareto. 
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
This section summarises the results obtained from fitting the Pareto models to the data and 
compares the amended data sets including the Pareto tail with the raw sample data. Table 2 
contains the results for the 22 EU countries in our sample. Fitting a Pareto tail to the data for 
those countries for which rich list data are available leads to a considerable upward revision 
of the wealth holdings of the richest 1% of households. The upward revision is reflected by an 
increase in the top 1% wealth share as well as by a (corresponding) increase in the total wealth 
holdings of the individual countries. In the case of Germany, for example, the raw survey data 
report total net wealth of €9,394 billion and a top 1% wealth share of 19% and zero billionaires. 
After adding the Pareto tail, total net wealth increases to €12,520 billion, a top 1% wealth share 
of 38% and an estimated number of 211 billionaires. The fact that the raw data do not include 
any billionaires is an obvious indication of the under-reporting of wealth held by the most 
affluent households. For the data set as a whole (EU22) our approach leads to an increase of 
aggregate net wealth from €35.7 trillion to €43.6 trillion and the top 1% share increases from 
18% to 32%. We provide a fully tabulated summary of the wealth distribution for the EU22 in 
the Appendix (see Table 8 for average wealth per percentile, Table 9 for percentile cut-offs 
and Table 10 for total wealth in each percentile). The Online Appendix contains equivalent 
tabulations for all 22 countries in our sample. It is important to keep in mind that these point 
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estimates are subject to substantial statistical uncertainty. We address this issue in section 
4.4 below. 
 
Table 3 puts our results into perspective and compares them with other available information 
of the top tail of the wealth distribution in Europe. The challenge is that high quality 
distributional data of household wealth in Europe other than HFCS data are scarce. One 
exception is Germany, where the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) produced a 
data set on household wealth, using publicly available information on German shareholders 
to oversample high-net-worth individuals (Schröder et al 2020). The explicit goal of the sample 
design was to adequately observe the top tail of the wealth distribution. Based on this data set 
the DIW estimates the top 1% wealth share to be 35.3%, which is well in line with our results. 
The same holds for the top 5% and top 10% share (Table 3). When it comes to the number of 
billionaires in Germany, the Manager Magazin publishes a German rich list and for the year 
2017 it included 170 billionaires. Given that many of the list entries represent entire family 
clans, representing more than 1 household, our estimate of 211 billionaires is again well 
aligned with the available exogenous information on the richest households in Germany.  
 
Another country for which additional information on the top tail of the wealth distribution is 
available outside the HFCS is France. Garbinti et al (2020) for example report top wealth 
shares for France in 2014 of 55.3% for the top 10%, 43.1% for the top 5% and 23.4% for the 
top 1%. Our corresponding results are 55.9%, 43.9% and 27.5% respectively (Table 3). When 
it comes to the number of French billionaires, the magazine Challenge reports 68 French 
billionaires in 2017 in comparison with 79 billionaires according to our estimates. Since the 
Challenge list includes family clans as well, these two results are again well aligned. 
 
Krenek and Schratzenstaller (2018) estimate wealth holdings in Europe and focus on closing 
the gap between the total financial assets reported in the HFCS compared to national accounts 
data. Their final estimate of total net wealth across the 22 countries in our sample is €49,599bn 
compared to our estimate of €43,629 billion (Table 3). This demonstrates that aiming to close 
the under-reporting gap at the top of the distribution might not be enough to correct for the 
general under-reporting of wealth in household surveys, which would lead to a downward bias 
in our results. Compared to Krenek and Schratzenstaller (2018) the estimates of the total net 
wealth in our sample are conservative since they are roughly €6 trillion lower. 
 
Finally, if we compare the number of billionaires in our amended data set including the Pareto 
tail with the raw survey data and the national rich lists we use, we find that our Pareto model 
produces 461 billionaires across the 10 countries in our sample for which we could obtain rich 
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list data. This compares with zero billionaires in the raw survey data and with 431 billionaires 
on the 10 national rich lists. 
 
Table 2: Wealth distribution in Europe 
  Raw survey data Pareto model 

















(% of total 
wealth) 
Billionaires  
Austria* 985 23% 0 1,525 47% 44 
Belgium* 1,789 16% 0 2,127 29% 22 
Cyprus* 152 22% 0 207 46% 7 
Germany* 9,394 19% 0 12,520 38% 211 
Estonia 66 25% 0 91 45% 0 
Spain* 4,568 20% 0 4,649 21% 8 
Finland 553 14% 0 623 24% 0 
France* 7,097 17% 0 8,207 28% 79 
Greece* 391 9% 0 458 21% 1 
Croatia 159 19% 0 213 39% 0 
Hungary 292 20% 0 358 35% 0 
Ireland 678 15% 0 787 27% 0 
Italy* 5,468 12% 0 6,787 27% 57 
Lithuania 108 15% 0 133 31% 0 
Luxembourg 203 20% 0 263 38% 0 
Latvia 36 19% 0 43 33% 0 
Malta 68 17% 0 90 38% 0 
Netherlands* 1,450 21% 0 1,813 36% 25 
Poland 1,278 14% 0 1,641 33% 0 
Portugal* 668 23% 0 724 29% 7 
Slovenia* 119 15% 0 129 21% 0 
Slovakia 192 12% 0 242 31% 0 
EU22 35,713 18% 0 43,629 32% 461 
*Rich list information was available and used to fit the Pareto tail. Sources: Household Finance and Consumption 
Survey and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Overall, Table 3 demonstrates that the approach taken in this policy study to address the 
under-representation of high-net-worth households in survey data, and in the third wave of the 
HFCS in particular, yields plausible and robust results. Comparing key measures of wealth 
concentration based on the Pareto-amended data with several other data sources indicates 
that our model is well in line with these alternative data sources. 
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Table 3: Assessing the model fit 




Pareto* Schröder et al 2020* 
Top 1% 18.6% 37.7% 35.3% 
Top 5% 40.8% 55.2% 54.9% 
Top 10% 55.4% 66.3% 67.3% 




Pareto* Garbinti et al 2020* 
Top 1% 17.1% 27.5% 23.4% 
Top 5% 35.5% 43.9% 43.1% 





Pareto** Krenek and Schratzenstaller 2018** 





Pareto National rich lists 
Billionaires in the EU22 0 461 431 
*% of total wealth holdings, **€bn. Source: raw survey estimates are from the HFCS’s third wave and the survey + 
pareto results are based on the authors’ calculations (eg. Table 2). 
 
4. The revenue potential of a European net 
wealth tax 
This section presents the rationale behind the wealth tax models we study, explains how the 
revenue estimates are obtained, and presents the results including estimates of the likely 
upper and lower bounds of our estimates. 
4.1. Tax models 
Model I (flat tax model) serves as a simple and easy to understand baseline. It exhibits a 
constant tax rate of 2%, starting for net wealth holdings above €1 million. This €1 million 
threshold leaves 97% of the population exempt. The constant tax rate means that a billionaire 
household is taxed in the same way as a millionaire household. The tax rate of 2% is low 
compared to average rates of return on wealth. Jordà et al (2019) report a return in excess of 
9% on equity wealth for example. If tax rates are below the rate of return, the tax can be paid 
out of the resulting capital income and the concentration of wealth will not decrease and will 
potentially increase further over time. This means the flat tax model is not expected to be able 
to reduce current levels of wealth inequality. 
 
Model II (mildly progressive model) exhibits a progressive structure which means the tax 
rate increases with net wealth. A billionaire household faces a higher tax rate than a millionaire 
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household. The tax rate starts at 1% on net wealth beyond €1 million (leaving 97% of the 
population exempt), increases to 2% beyond €2 million (corresponding to richest 1% of all 
EU22 households, which is roughly 1.9 million households)11 and finally increases to 3% on 
net assets beyond €5 million (corresponding to the richest 0.3% of all EU22 households, which 
is roughly 550,000 households). Even though tax rates increase with net wealth in the mildly 
progressive model II, they remain well below the return on wealth. Thus, model II is only 
expected to slow down the tendency of increasing wealth inequality but is not expected to stop 
it or reduce current inequalities. 
 
Model III (strongly progressive model) also exhibits a progressive structure. However, in 
contrast to model II, tax rates increase faster and are likely to be close to or above actual rates 
of return on wealth. In addition, model III starts at a higher threshold: a rate of 2% applies to 
net assets beyond €2 million which means 99% of all households are exempt. The rate 
increases to 3% beyond €5 million (richest 0.3% or 550,000 households), 5% beyond €10 
million (richest 0.1% or 220,000 households), 7% beyond €50 million (richest 0.01% or 23,000 
households), 8% beyond €100 million (richest 0.005% or 9,000 households) and the final 
bracket levies a rate of 10% on net assets beyond €500 million (richest 0.001% or 1,200 
households).12 The tax rates in the highest brackets of this model are similar to the rates of 
returns reported in the literature. For example, Jordà et al (2019) estimate the average rate of 
return on equities at roughly 9%, Fagereng et al (2020) use Norwegian tax data and show that 
the rate of return on net wealth is above 10% at the 90th percentile. Bach et al (2020) use 
Swedish tax data and estimate the return in excess of the Swedish interest rate to be 8% for 
the richest 0.01% of tax subjects. This means the strongly progressive model III is expected 
to decrease current levels of inequality over time. 
 
Model IV (wealth cap model) represents a fundamentally different approach by introducing 
an effective maximum level of wealth and by defining tax brackets based on multiples of 
average wealth. It was proposed by Thomas Piketty (2020). Average net wealth across the 
EU22 is roughly €260,000 (based on the Pareto tail amended data). Piketty suggests a tax of 
0.1% for wealth holdings beyond half the average, a rate of 1% for holdings beyond twice the 
average, 2% for net wealth beyond 5 times the average, going up to 60% beyond 1,000 times 
the average and 90% beyond 10,000 times the average, which is equivalent to €2.6 billion. 
Piketty’s wealth cap model would still leave 59% of all households exempt. It is characterised 
by marginal tax rates which are substantially above the rate of return on net wealth and thus 
 
11 Differences from the tables reported in the Appendix are due to rounding. 
12 We rounded these numbers and they should be interpreted as noisy estimates. 
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would be expected to sharply reduce current wealth inequality. Model IV introduces an 
effective maximum level of wealth (cap) at 1,000 times the average (€260 million). Table 4 
summarises the four models. 
 
Table 4: Tax models I to IV 










Approach Flat rate Progressive 







Progressive rate – 
introducing a wealth 
cap 
% of population exempt 97% 97% 99% 59% 
Tax brackets  Tax rates  Tax brackets 
Tax 
rates 
from €1 million 
€1 million ≈ top 3% 









from €2 million 
€2 million ≈ top 1% 









from €5 million 
€ 5 million ≈ top 0.3% 









from €10 million 
€10 million ≈ top 0.1% 
or 220,000 households 






from €50 million 
€50 million ≈ top 0.01% 
or 23,000 households 






from €100 million 
€100 million ≈ top 0.005% 
or 9,000 households 






from €500 million 
€500 million ≈ top 0.001% 
or 1,200 households 







Average wealth in the EU22 is €260,000 (based on Pareto tail amended data). The tax brackets for model IV 
therefore start at €130,000 (0.5 times average); €520,000 (2 times the average); €1.3 million (5 times the average); 
€2.6 million (10 times the average); €26 million (100 times the average); €260 million (1,000 times the average) 
and €2.6 billion (10,000 times the average). 
 
4.2. Revenue estimation 
We apply these four tax models to data from the ECB’s Household Finance and Consumption 
Survey (HFCS) on 22 EU countries.13 The HFCS is a large-scale household survey from which 
 
13 Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
Spain. 
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we obtain measures of household net wealth. This means our wealth measure subtracts all 
outstanding liabilities from the value of all household assets. Thus, if a household has assets 
in the form of its primary residence (€800,000), two luxury cars (€250,000) and bank accounts 
(€400,000), while also having an outstanding mortgage (€300,000) and a car loan (€50,000), 
this household’s net wealth would be equal to €1,100,000. The HFCS provides information 
about household gross wealth across five different categories: the first is real estate assets, 
which includes the main residence and any other real estate assets. The second asset 
category includes the value of self-employed and non-self-employed privately held 
businesses. The third category consists of current and savings accounts. The fourth category 
consists of financial assets such as bonds, stocks and private pension wealth held directly or 
in managed accounts. The fifth category includes any other assets such as cars and other 
valuables. Net wealth is calculated as the difference between the value across all asset 
categories minus all outstanding liabilities such as mortgages, car loans, consumer loans etc.  
 
Tax revenues are calculated in the following way: if we use the household from the previous 
paragraph, with net wealth of €1,100,000 and the flat tax model (model I) with an exemption 
threshold of €1 million and a tax rate of 2% as an example, this household would be taxed at 
€2,000 per year. If the threshold went up to €2 million, this household would be fully exempt. 
The revenue estimates in Table 5 are the results of equivalent calculations for all observations 
in our sample, which are then scaled up to the actual population size of the country. Revenues 
are estimated for all four tax models, first based on the raw survey data which do not 
adequately capture the tail of the wealth distribution (column 1). Secondly, we estimate tax 
revenues based on the Pareto tail amended survey data (column 2). Third, we use the Pareto 
amended survey data with a reduced the tax base (ie, household net wealth) to account for 
tax evasion (column 3). Fourth, we use the Pareto amended survey data and a strongly 
reduced tax base due to tax evasion (column 4). To quantify the degree of tax evasion of tax 
subjects we rely on established estimates in the literature (Bach and Beznoska 2012). We 
calculate the potential revenues by factoring in evasion in two manners; in column 3, we 
reduce the tax base of each tax subject in the following manner: real estate assets by 20%, 
financial assets by 24%, directly held companies by 13% and any other assets by 100%. To 
simulate a strong evasion reaction by tax subjects we double the reduction factors for financial 
assets (48%) and directly held companies (26%).  
4.3. Results 
Our results are presented in Table 5. We provide revenue estimates based on our sample of 
22 EU countries in billion euros (2017 prices), in % of 2017 GDP (€11,862 billion) and in % of 
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general government total revenue (2017). Table 5 contains so-called ‘point estimates’ which 
represent the best result given the available data. They do not provide any information about 
the unavoidable uncertainty which is attached to the results of statistical models. We will 
address the statistical uncertainty associated with our results in the next subsection.  
 
Table 5: Tax revenue estimates for models I to IV  






Survey data + 
Pareto tail 
Survey data + 
Pareto tail + 
evasion 
Survey data + 
Pareto tail + 
strong evasion 
 in billion € 117 271 192 164 
Model I in % of GDP 1.0% 2.3% 1.6% 1.4% 
flat tax in % of gov rev 2.1% 5.0% 3.5% 3.0% 
 in billion € 103 316 224 190 
Model II in % of GDP 0.9% 2.7% 1.9% 1.6% 
mildly progressive in % of gov rev 1.9% 5.8% 4.1% 3.5% 
 in billion € 88 505 357 303 
Model III in % of GDP 0.7% 4.3% 3.0% 2.6% 
strongly progressive in % of gov rev 1.6% 9.3% 6.6% 5.6% 
 in billion € 249 1,837 1,281 1,081 
Model IV in % of GDP 2.1% 15.5% 10.8% 9.1% 
wealth cap in % of gov rev 4.6% 33.7% 23.5% 19.9% 
Estimated tax revenues for models I to IV, reported in billion € (2017 prices), in % of 2017 GDP and in % of total 
government revenue for the EU22 (Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
and Spain). The tax bands and the corresponding rates are presented in Table 4. Source: Own calculations and 
HFCS. 
 
Three general observations emerge from Table 5: first, the results show that raising 
substantial revenues of more than 1.5% of GDP (€180 billion) with a net wealth tax is 
possible even after taking potential tax evasion into account (columns 3 and 4 of Table 5). 
Second, opting for highly progressive tax rates would allow governments to raise substantially 
more: 3% of GDP (€350 billion) with model III and 11% of GDP (€1,280 billion) with Piketty’s 
wealth cap model. These are significant volumes given that these are estimates of annual 
revenues.14 In comparison, the EU’s Covid recovery fund is equal to €750 billion over 10 years 
or roughly €75 billion annually. Put differently, the estimated revenues of the strongly 
progressive model III amount to €300 billion annually, which is roughly the same amount the 
EU currently plans to hand out in the form of grants as part of the Covid recovery fund over a 
decade. Third, only a small fraction of the population would be taxed. Households with net 
wealth beyond €1 million represent the richest 3% of all households across the 22 EU 
 
14 For the wealth cap model, a drop in revenues would be expected after the maximum level of wealth 
is established. 
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countries in our sample, and households with net wealth beyond €2 million represent the 
richest 1% of all households in the EU22.  
 
Despite the efforts in this policy study, our data are still suffering from an under-
representation of extremely wealthy households, since for those countries where no rich 
lists were available15 we only upscaled existing households. This approach does not yield 
billionaire observations or observations with net-wealth holdings of hundreds of million for 
those countries. The implication is that the reported wealth tax revenues are still likely to 
underestimate the true potential. In particular, revenue estimates for models III and IV are 
most seriously affected because they tax multimillionaire households more than models I and 
II. 
 
Finally, Table 5 contains a seemingly paradoxical result: when using the raw survey data 
(column 1), the flat tax model I (threshold €1 million) yields annual revenues of €117 billion 
compared to €88 billion by the strongly progressive model III (threshold €2 million). This result 
vanishes as soon as the Pareto tail is added to the data and the under-representation of 
wealthy households is at least partially taken into account. In columns 2, 3 and 4, the strongly 
progressive model III always yields higher estimates than the flat tax model I. This highlights 
the problem of under-reporting in the raw survey data and the importance of correcting 
it in order to obtain a realistic assessment of different tax models.  
 
Comparing the results in this study with recent revenue estimates in the scientific literature 
yields the following picture: Revenue estimates of a European net wealth tax range from 
1.05% of GDP (Landais et al 2020) to 1.47% of GDP (Krenek and Schratzenstaller 2018). The 
former propose a mildly progressive tax of 1% on net wealth holdings in excess of €2 million, 
which is roughly the top 1% of households in the EU27. For net wealth beyond €8 million a 
2% tax rate is applied and beyond €1 billion a tax rate of 3%. The mildly progressive model II 
is most comparable to Landais et al’s proposal and yields estimated revenues of 1.9% of GDP. 
Given the more progressive nature of model II compared to Landais et al, the results are very 
similar. The only other study of a European net wealth tax (Krenek and Schratzenstaller 2018) 
applies a tax rate of 1% beyond net wealth of €1 million and 1.5% beyond €1.5 million. Based 
on this revenue estimates of 1.5% of GDP are obtained. In comparison the flat tax model I in 
this study is estimated to yield revenues of 1.5% of GDP.  
 
 
15 These are Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Poland, and Slovakia. 
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4.4. Statistical significance 
The data, on which the results in Table 5 are based, represent a sample of the population in 
the EU22. Whenever conclusions about the population are drawn based on a sample, these 
conclusions exhibit some degree of uncertainty due to the randomness with which participating 
households were selected. The HFCS comes with a set of 1,000 so-called ‘replicate weights’ 
which simulate 1,000 alternative possible data sets and thus provide information on the 
variability of the available data and the results based on them. We used these replicate weights 
to calculate 1,000 alternative revenue estimates for each entry in Table 5 and thus obtained a 
range of 1,000 possible results. Ordering them from the lowest to the highest result for each 
model, we then used the middle 95% as our ‘range of plausible results’ or our 95% confidence 
interval. These ranges are reported in Table 6 below.  
 
Table 6: Confidence intervals for estimated tax revenues (€bn) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Raw survey 
data 
Survey data + 
Pareto tail 
Survey data + 
Pareto tail + 
evasion 
Survey data + 





UPPER 145 302 215 184 
POINT 117 271 192 164 




UPPER 134 359 256 219 
POINT 103 316 224 190 




UPPER 121 598 427 362 
POINT 88 505 357 303 




UPPER 303 2,302 1,622 1,372 
POINT 249 1,837 1,281 1,081 
LOWER 203 1,521 1,054 888 
The rows labelled ‘POINT’ contain the point estimate from Table 5 and are reproduced here for convenience. The 
rows labelled ‘UPPER’ contain the upper bound and the rows labelled ‘LOWER’ contain the lower bound of the 
95% confidence interval we calculated, based on a set of 1,000 replicate weights from the HFCS.   
 
While it is expected for some variation to be found in the estimates presented in Table 6, the 
fundamental result is that the lower bound is always substantially higher than zero. This means 
that our results strongly suggest that introducing an annual tax on net wealth has the potential 
to generate substantial revenues. Our lowest estimate for the raw survey data is €64 billion 
and €147 billion after including the Pareto tail but assuming strong tax evasion. On the other 
hand, the upper bounds are substantial. For example, the strongly progressive model III could 
yield up to €427 billion annually under the assumption of moderate tax evasion. 
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5. A well-designed European Net Wealth Tax 
Taxation of wealth is often met with fierce resistance, sometimes seconded by the argument 
that it is not practically feasible. This section looks at some of the practical concerns around 
implementation of a net wealth tax. Firstly, a wealth tax will benefit from implementation at the 
European level or at least from a consistent implementation at the national level across 
member states. The reason is that taxing wealth across the EU will increase tax 
authorities’ enforcement power and will reduce the ability for tax evasion. While these 
are clear benefits of an implementation on the European level, they do not by any means imply 
that national wealth tax initiatives are not viable. The successful implementation in 
Switzerland, Norway and Spain demonstrates the converse (see section 2.2). Also, the 
revenue potential at the national level remains high (Heck et al 2020). All four proposed models 
share the common feature of a deliberately broad tax base, meaning no exemptions are 
granted. This simplifies administrative burdens and cross-country implementation, especially 
in combination with high thresholds. 
 
Secondly, the issue of how assets are valued is an important question. The basic principle 
should be to value assets at their current market price. For some assets, such as bank 
accounts or publicly traded securities, market values are readily available. Real estate is taxed 
in some form in many countries already and, as a result, valuations are available. In those 
cases where real estate taxation is based on historic values, transaction data need to be used 
to build databases of market valuations which can be used together with expert valuations to 
calculate taxable wealth. For harder to value assets such as privately held businesses for 
which no transaction record or comparable assets exist, tax authorities can rely on two options. 
On the one hand, the value can be estimated based on a formula taking past profitability, 
turnover and key business characteristics into account. Switzerland does this successfully and 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in America uses formulas to value stock options for income 
taxation purposes (Saez and Zucman 2019). On the other hand, if a formula-based approach 
is not feasible, owners can be given the opportunity to pay the tax liability in shares (Saez et 
al 2021). 
 
Thirdly, the issue of valuation is closely tied to the broader question of enforcement and to 
what extent tax authorities are given the tools they need. Starving tax authorities of adequate 
funding, and not providing them with the adequate tools, is surely more of a political choice 
than an economic imperative. To enforce a wealth tax, tax authorities need additional 
resources in terms of staff and funding as well as specialised infrastructure (databases for 
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asset valuations, automatic information exchange with financial institutions, as well as 
beneficial ownership registries). This infrastructure will not only allow proper enforcement of a 
net wealth tax but will also be crucial in the more general fight against tax evasion and 
organised crime (ICRICT 2019). In addition to this ‘fairness dividend’, this infrastructure will 
enable tax authorities to automate the calculation of outstanding tax liabilities to a high degree 
and issue pre-populated tax statements. Several tax authorities use these practices already 
and in doing so greatly reduce the administrative burden on tax subjects (OECD 2006, Saez 
and Zucman 2019). 
 
Fourth, often concerns are raised about the high administrative costs of net wealth taxes and 
it is claimed that revenues would fall short of the costs. Based on the revenue estimates 
presented in section 4.3 it is hard to imagine administrative costs of such magnitudes. Studies 
which report revenues that fall short of, or are close to, the estimated administrative costs 
reach this conclusion either because of extremely low tax rates (below 1% annually) or 
because of unrealistically high cost estimates. The latter are usually high not because of the 
cost of running the infrastructure but because of the estimated cost of compliance on the side 
of taxpayers. We deliberately abstain from providing such an estimate. Those countries which 
successfully levy wealth taxes demonstrate that compliance costs can be kept at a reasonable 
level. In addition, high compliance costs often stem from deliberate complexity in order to 
evade taxes. It is thus unclear why such costs should be used as an argument against taxation. 
Most importantly, however, having proper infrastructure in place which allows for highly 
automated assessment of the tax liability and pre-filled tax records has the potential to 
substantially reduce the administrative burden on tax subjects. 
 
Lastly, in addition to imposing reporting duties on domestic financial institutions, the EU should 
use its size to put pressure on foreign jurisdictions, and tax havens in particular, to provide 
information on tax subjects holding assets in these jurisdictions (automatic information 
exchange). The US FACTA agreement demonstrates that such information requirements can 
be enforced.  
 
Overall, the implementation of a European net wealth tax requires some practical problems to 
be overcome. None of them, however, represent a fundamental or insurmountable obstacle. 
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6. Conclusion 
This policy study provides revenue estimates for a range of possible tax designs of a European 
net wealth tax. While such revenue estimates are crucial for an informed public debate on the 
topic, producing realistic estimates is difficult due to the lack of data available on the wealth 
holdings of the most affluent households in Europe. We address this problem in two steps, 
first we use the ECB’s new Household and Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) as our 
primary data source. Second, we model the tail of the wealth distribution with a type I Pareto 
distribution, which we fit to the survey data. A full tabulation of the wealth distribution in the 
EU22 can be found in the Appendix and in individual country tables in our Online Appendix. 
Based on this amended data set we derive the following conclusions:  
 
First, household wealth is highly concentrated among the wealthiest households in the EU22: 
the richest 1% hold 32% of total net wealth while the poorest half of all households only hold 
about 4.5% of total net wealth. This means that the ability of the wealthiest households 
to pay for the costs of the Covid-19 and climate crises is much higher than previously 
suggested. Focusing on taxing the richest 1% or richest 3% of households can be justified 
not only by their ability to pay but also by the fact that rich households tend to leave larger 
carbon footprints. While highly subjective, many perceive wealth taxes as fair because of their 
ability to reduce or even inverse endogenous tendencies towards an increasing concentration 
of wealth. Hence, they might be a key tool for maintaining public support for the difficult 
transition towards a low resource intense and carbon neutral economy. This latter point 
becomes especially important if highly regressive energy taxes are required for a successful 
transition away from fossil fuels. Lastly, taxing wealth at the top is unlikely to hamper fragile 
post-Covid recoveries, unlike the generation of revenues via consumption taxes. 
 
Second, this policy study shows that a European net wealth tax can raise substantial 
revenues even when taking tax evasion into account. The high revenue potential is the flip 
side of the observed high levels of wealth concentration. We consider our estimates to be 
conservative and probably still an underestimation of the true potential due to the under-
representation of rich households, which is still likely to persist to some extent in our data 
despite applying the best available methods to address it. The only other tax proposal that is 
discussed in this policy study, and that exhibits a similar revenue potential, is a harmonised 
corporate income tax with a common minimum tax rate of 35% across the EU27. The 
combined revenue potential of the proposals discussed in section 2 together with a net wealth 
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tax lies between 2.2% and 8.3% of GDP annually (see Table 7)16. This would be a big step 
towards mobilising the 6.1% of GDP needed annually for the carbon neutrality transformation 
of the economy (Wildauer et al 2020). 
 
Table 7: Tax revenues in % of GDP 
 Low Estimate Upper Estimate 
Net wealth tax 1.0% A 2.9% B 
Financial Transaction Tax 0.4% C 0.9% D 
Harmonised corporate income tax 0.2% E 3.5% F 
End fossil fuel subsidies 0.3% G 0.3% G 
ETS reform 0.1% H 0.1% H 
Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism 0.2% I 0.5% I 
Total 2.2% 8.3% 
Green Deal Requirement 1.3% J 6.1% K 
Table entries are based on the following sources. A: Landais et al (2020); B: Authors’ calculation, strongly 
progressive model III with tax evasion effects (Table 5, column 3); C: European Commission (2013); D: 
Schulmeister (2011); E: Refers to a harmonised tax base only, no harmonised rates. Based on Tørsløv et al (2020); 
F: Calculation based on a harmonised rate of 35% using data from Tørsløv et al (2020). G: Based on Trinomics 
(2018); H: Based on EC (2020); I: Based on Krenek et al (2018); J: Based on EC (2018b) Table 10, excluding 
transport; K: Based on Wildauer et al (2020). All monetary values have been transformed into 2019 prices and 
scaled with the respective country aggregate GDP figures for 2019. For sources G, I and J that is the EU28, for 
sources A, D, E, H and K that is the EU27, for source B it is the EU22 as used in this study, for source F it is the 
EU16 non-tax haven as defined in footnote 5 and for source C it is Austria, Belgium, Greece, France, Germany, 
Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. 
 
Third, a combination of clever design choices, more resources and better infrastructure 
for the EU’s tax authorities would make a European net wealth tax feasible. With respect 
to the design of the tax, high exemption thresholds between €1 million and €2 million would 
not only exempt the vast majority of households (97% to 99%) but combined with a broad tax 
base and paired with progressive tax rates, would mean a wealth tax is able to generate 
substantial revenues while eliminating many of the problems that undermined past net wealth 
taxes in Europe, such as illiquid tax subjects and loopholes due to complicated exemption 
rules. Boosting tax authorities’ resources to enforce the tax and to build appropriate 
infrastructure, such as real estate valuation databases and company registers, will ensure high 
levels of compliance and enforcement. Best practice examples such as Switzerland (valuation) 
and Norway (third party reporting) exist and can be used as a point of reference for successful 
implementation.  
 
Therefore, based on the findings of this report we recommend the implementation of a 
European net wealth tax. Such a tax should feature a progressive design, like models III and 
IV in combination with high exemption thresholds between €1 and €2 million. Implementation 
 
16 The studies used in Table 7 are based on different country groupings. See the table for the full 
details. This means the totals of 2.2% and 8.3% need to be interpreted carefully and the changing 
country composition needs to be considered.  
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at the European level is desirable as it reduces the room for tax evasion and avoidance and 
European cooperation increases tax authorities’ enforcement power. A European wealth tax 
along these lines would not only provide the resources needed for the transformation of 
Europe into a sustainable society but would also be a highly effective tool to reduce the 
concentration of wealth in the hands of the richest 1% of households (roughly 1.9 million 
families in the EU22) which currently hold 32% of total net wealth. Lastly, using such a tax to 
connect and upgrade Europe’s tax authorities and their infrastructure, most importantly by 
comprehensive beneficial ownership registries, would yield a fairness dividend in the form 
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Table 8: Average net wealth per percentile for the EU22 in euros. 
Perc Raw Pareto Perc Raw Pareto Perc Raw Pareto 
100 3,905,000 8,263,000 67 176,000 177,000 33 31,000 31,000 
99 1,488,000 1,654,000 66 169,000 170,000 32 29,000 29,000 
98 1,109,000 1,164,000 65 163,000 164,000 31 26,000 26,000 
97 913,000 946,000 64 157,000 158,000 30 24,000 24,000 
96 782,000 799,000 63 152,000 152,000 29 22,000 22,000 
95 703,000 715,000 62 146,000 146,000 28 19,000 20,000 
94 636,000 643,000 61 140,000 140,000 27 17,000 18,000 
93 580,000 587,000 60 134,000 134,000 26 16,000 16,000 
92 539,000 544,000 59 129,000 129,000 25 14,000 14,000 
91 504,000 509,000 58 123,000 124,000 24 13,000 13,000 
90 470,000 474,000 57 119,000 119,000 23 11,000 11,000 
89 444,000 448,000 56 113,000 114,000 22 10,000 10,000 
88 419,000 422,000 55 108,000 109,000 21 9,000 9,000 
87 398,000 400,000 54 104,000 104,000 20 8,000 8,000 
86 379,000 381,000 53 100,000 100,000 19 6,000 7,000 
85 359,000 361,000 52 95,000 96,000 18 6,000 6,000 
84 340,000 342,000 51 91,000 92,000 17 5,000 5,000 
83 326,000 327,000 50 88,000 88,000 16 4,000 4,000 
82 312,000 313,000 49 84,000 84,000 15 3,000 3,000 
81 299,000 300,000 48 80,000 80,000 14 3,000 3,000 
80 286,000 288,000 47 76,000 76,000 13 2,000 2,000 
79 275,000 276,000 46 72,000 72,000 12 2,000 2,000 
78 264,000 265,000 45 69,000 69,000 11 1,000 1,000 
77 254,000 255,000 44 65,000 65,000 10 1,000 1,000 
76 244,000 245,000 43 61,000 61,000 9 1,000 1,000 
75 235,000 236,000 42 58,000 58,000 8 0 0 
74 227,000 228,000 41 54,000 55,000 7 0 0 
73 218,000 219,000 40 51,000 52,000 6 0 0 
72 211,000 212,000 39 49,000 49,000 5 0 0 
71 204,000 204,000 38 45,000 46,000 4 -2,000 -2,000 
70 197,000 198,000 37 42,000 42,000 3 -5,000 -5,000 
69 190,000 191,000 36 39,000 39,000 2 -15,000 -15,000 
68 183,000 184,000 35 36,000 36,000 1 -103,000 -103,000    
34 34,000 34,000 
   
The total number of households in the EU22 is 168 million and thus each percentile (in column 
Perc) contains roughly 1.68 million households. The displayed values are estimates and thus to 
avoid the impression of overstated precision have been rounded to the nearest 1000-euro value. 






Table 9: Percentile cut-offs for the EU22 in euros 
Perc Raw Pareto Perc Raw Pareto Perc Raw Pareto 
100 1,874,000 2,153,000 67 172,000 173,000 33 30,000 30,000 
99 1,245,000 1,322,000 66 167,000 167,000 32 27,000 28,000 
98 1,002,000 1,039,000 65 160,000 161,000 31 25,000 25,000 
97 836,000 861,000 64 155,000 155,000 30 23,000 23,000 
96 741,000 754,000 63 149,000 150,000 29 20,000 21,000 
95 665,000 675,000 62 142,000 143,000 28 19,000 19,000 
94 607,000 614,000 61 137,000 137,000 27 16,000 16,000 
93 556,000 562,000 60 131,000 132,000 26 15,000 15,000 
92 522,000 526,000 59 126,000 126,000 25 13,000 13,000 
91 485,000 490,000 58 121,000 121,000 24 12,000 12,000 
90 457,000 460,000 57 116,000 116,000 23 11,000 11,000 
89 430,000 434,000 56 111,000 111,000 22 9,000 9,000 
88 407,000 409,000 55 106,000 107,000 21 8,000 8,000 
87 388,000 390,000 54 102,000 102,000 20 7,000 7,000 
86 369,000 371,000 53 98,000 98,000 19 6,000 6,000 
85 349,000 351,000 52 93,000 94,000 18 5,000 5,000 
84 333,000 334,000 51 90,000 90,000 17 4,000 4,000 
83 318,000 319,000 50 86,000 86,000 16 4,000 4,000 
82 305,000 307,000 49 82,000 83,000 15 3,000 3,000 
81 293,000 294,000 48 78,000 78,000 14 2,000 2,000 
80 281,000 282,000 47 74,000 74,000 13 2,000 2,000 
79 269,000 271,000 46 71,000 71,000 12 2,000 2,000 
78 259,000 259,000 45 67,000 67,000 11 1,000 1,000 
77 249,000 250,000 44 63,000 63,000 10 1,000 1,000 
76 239,000 240,000 43 60,000 60,000 9 0 0 
75 231,000 232,000 42 56,000 56,000 8 0 0 
74 223,000 223,000 41 53,000 53,000 7 0 0 
73 215,000 215,000 40 50,000 50,000 6 0 0 
72 207,000 208,000 39 47,000 47,000 5 -1,000 -1,000 
71 200,000 201,000 38 44,000 44,000 4 -3,000 -3,000 
70 194,000 194,000 37 41,000 41,000 3 -8,000 -8,000 
69 186,000 187,000 36 38,000 38,000 2 -28,000 -28,000 
68 180,000 181,000 35 35,000 35,000 1 -6,758,000 -6,758,000    
34 32,000 32,000 
   
Percentile cut-offs represent the beginning of the percentile. Percentile 1 thus represents the minimum 
of the data set and percentile 51 represents the median. The total number of households in the EU22 is 
168 million and thus each percentile contains roughly 1.68 million households. The displayed values are 
estimates and thus to avoid the impression of overstated precision have been rounded to the nearest 





Table 10: Total net wealth per percentile for the EU22 in billion euros. 
Perc Raw Pareto Perc Raw Pareto Perc Raw Pareto 
100 6,539 13,868 67 296 296 33 52 52 
99 2,499 2,779 66 284 286 32 48 49 
98 1,865 1,953 65 274 276 31 44 44 
97 1,529 1,590 64 264 265 30 40 40 
96 1,318 1,336 63 256 255 29 36 36 
95 1,180 1,205 62 245 246 28 33 33 
94 1,070 1,080 61 235 235 27 29 29 
93 974 986 60 225 226 26 26 26 
92 905 914 59 216 216 25 23 24 
91 848 854 58 207 208 24 21 21 
90 788 795 57 199 200 23 19 19 
89 747 749 56 190 191 22 17 17 
88 696 709 55 182 183 21 15 15 
87 675 674 54 175 175 20 13 13 
86 635 639 53 167 168 19 11 11 
85 604 607 52 161 161 18 10 10 
84 571 573 51 154 154 17 8 8 
83 546 550 50 146 148 16 7 7 
82 524 527 49 143 142 15 5 5 
81 503 504 48 135 135 14 5 5 
80 479 483 47 128 128 13 4 4 
79 464 459 46 121 121 12 3 3 
78 443 449 45 115 116 11 2 2 
77 422 427 44 109 109 10 2 2 
76 414 414 43 103 103 9 1 1 
75 394 396 42 97 98 8 1 1 
74 381 380 41 91 92 7 0 0 
73 367 369 40 86 87 6 0 0 
72 355 355 39 82 82 5 0 0 
71 342 342 38 76 77 4 -3 -3 
70 331 333 37 71 71 3 -8 -8 
69 318 321 36 66 66 2 -25 -25 
68 308 309 35 61 61 1 -175 -175 
   34 56 57    
The total number of households in the EU22 is 168 million and thus each 
percentile (in column Perc) contains roughly 1.68 million households. Source: 
Authors’ calculations and HFCS. 
